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ZERO PRIVACY: SCHOOLS ARE VIOLATING
STUDENTS' FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF
PRIVACY UNDER THE GUISE OF ENFORCING ZERO
TOLERANCE POLICIES
Elisabeth Frost
Abstract: The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a right
of privacy that protects against unwarranted governmental interference with an individual's
contraceptive choices. This privacy right protects minors as well as adults. School officials
serve as government actors for the purpose of Fourteenth Amendment analysis. Zero
tolerance drug policies are school disciplinary policies that mandate predetermined and
frequently severe consequences for specific offenses, often including the possession of
legally prescribed or legally obtained over-the-counter medication. Zero tolerance drug
policies have resulted in the often very public discipline of students for possessing a wide
array of otherwise legal medication, including birth control pills, without parental
permission. This Comment argues that schools may not enforce their discipline policies in
ways that violate a minor's right of privacy with regard to contraceptive choices. Zero
tolerance policies as applied to minors in possession of legally obtained contraceptives must
not force students to notify their parents of their procreative choices in order to comply with
the policy. At a minimum, such policies must include a bypass option that enables students to
avoid acquiring parental consent in order for those students to possess contraceptives at
school. In addition, zero tolerance policies may not violate a minor's constitutional right to
be free from state dissemination of their private affairs-a natural consequence of
disciplining students in possession of contraceptives in violation of the zero tolerance policy.
Erin is a typical high school junior.' She has never been in trouble at
school. One afternoon, a teacher sees Erin put a package of pills in her
pocket. The teacher reports this to the school administration and Erin is
called into the principal's office. Erin readily acknowledges that she is in
possession of birth control pills, which she obtained legally at a local
health clinic. The principal informs Erin that possession of medication
without parental permission violates the school's "zero tolerance"
policy,2 and that the school is required to suspend her under that policy.
1. Hypothetical scenario created by the author for illustrative purposes.
2. The zero tolerance policy of the School Board of the City of Virginia Beach is a representative
example:
[N]o student may have in his/her possession any medication or prescription drugs, even if
recommended or prescribed for the student's use. All such items will be taken to the principal's
office by the parent(s), legal guardian(s) or other responsible adult, or office designated by the
principal, at the start of the school day for safekeeping.... Medication will mean any drug or
other substances used in treating diseases, healing, or relieving pain, including all over-the-
counter drugs such as aspirin, cough syrups, gargles, caffeine pills and the like.
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Erin has not told her parents that she is taking birth control pills, a fact
that her parents necessarily become aware of when informed of her
suspension by the school. Erin's school community and the local media
also become aware of the fact that the school suspended her for
possessing birth control pills.3 Furthermore, the district tells Erin that her
permanent high school record will reflect that she was disciplined for
illegal possession of a drug.4
Schools first implemented zero tolerance drug policies in the 1980s.
5
These policies often ban the possession of prescription and over-the-
counter medication,6 thereby including medical contraceptives such as
birth control pills, hormonal patches, and the "morning after" pill.
7
Many of these policies allow students to bring legally prescribed or
over-the-counter medication to school only if the student's parent or
guardian first approves the student's possession of the medication.8 A
student who violates such a zero tolerance policy is subject to
mandatory, predetermined, and often severe consequences. 9
A minor's right of privacy regarding contraceptive choices is a
fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-45-lr.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
3. The media are often alerted to zero tolerance policy violations. See, e.g., John Grogan, Zero
Tolerance Running Amok, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 2005, at BOI (reporting a student's suspension
for taking Aleve, to relieve menstrual cramps, in violation of a zero tolerance policy); Editorial,
Zero Tolerance Plan Embarrasses District, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 13, 2004, at C2 (reporting a
student's five-day suspension for possessing heartburn-relief medication in violation of a zero
tolerance policy).
4. Zero tolerance policy violations may appear on school records. See, e.g., Sarah Kahne, District
Reduces Girl's Suspension, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 18, 2004, at 8A (reporting the district's
statement that a student's suspension for possession of birth control pills would be reflected in her
permanent record).
5. See Phillip Terzian, Commentary, Annals of Zero Tolerance, PROVIDENCE J. (R.I.), Oct. 17,
2004, at 19. As of 1997, at least 88% of schools nationwide had some form of zero tolerance policy
addressing a range of drug infractions. SHELIA HEAVISIDE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., VIOLENCE
AND DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 1996-97, at 18 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Challen Stephens, Students with Pills Face Discipline Ills, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, July
25, 2004 (on file with author) (quoting a school district official stating that possession of over-the-
counter or prescription medication would be a violation of the school's zero tolerance policy).
7. See Kahne, supra note 4.
8. See, e.g., School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-45-1r.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
9. See Robert C. Cloud, Due Process and Zero Tolerance: An Uneasy Alliance, 178 EDUC. L.
REP. I, 1 (2003).
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Constitution.'0 State interference with this right is constitutional only
where it advances a significant state interest in regulating the behavior of
minors that is not present in the case of adults." In addition, a state
regulation requiring parental consent or notification of a minor's
procreative choices is unconstitutional unless it grants the minor access
to an alternative procedure whereby she may avoid parental
involvement. 12 Moreover, where a minor's private choices involve the
decision "whether to bear or beget a child,"' 3 certain safeguards must be
in place to protect the confidentiality of the minor's decision-making.14
This Comment argues that a school may not threaten to or actually
10. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); see also id. at 693 (plurality
opinion) (reiterating that because minors, as well as adults, have a right of privacy related to
procreative and thus contraceptive choices, the test is less rigorous than the strict scrutiny analysis
applied to adults' privacy rights, requiring the state to show only a "significant" state interest);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60, 74-75 (1976) (holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment's right of privacy identified in Roe v. Wade protects minors' decisions
related to termination of pregnancy in the absence of a significant state interest not present in the
case of an adult).
1I. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 686; see also id. at 693 (plurality opinion) (stating that the test applied
to state infringement of a minor's procreative decision-making is less rigorous than the strict
scrutiny analysis applied to adults' privacy rights, requiring the state to show only a "significant"
state interest); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 60, 74-75 (holding that a state many not infringe upon minors'
decision-making related to termination of pregnancy in the absence of a significant state interest not
present in the case of an adult). School districts and school boards are considered state actors for the
purpose of Fourteenth Amendment protections. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336
(1985); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
12. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I), 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (plurality opinion); see also
id. at 654-56 (Stevens, J., concurring) (indicating that he would go further and not require a minor
to obtain permission by way of the courts because "[i]t is inherent in the right to make the abortion
decision that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny and in defiance of the contrary
opinion of the sovereign or other third parties"); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75 (holding that the State
does not have the authority to impose a blanket provision to give a third party an absolute veto over
the minor's decision to have an abortion, but referencing Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132
(1976) as suggesting that not every minor may have the maturity to consent independently to an
abortion); Bellotti 1, 428 U.S. at 147-48 (holding that the district court should have refrained from
deciding that the statute created an unconstitutional 'parental veto' over minors' abortion decision-
making and should have certified to the state supreme court for statutory interpretation, because the
statute could be interpreted as permitting a minor to bypass parental consent by obtaining a court
order).
13. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
14. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 512-13 (1990) (holding that
while complete anonymity is not critical, judicial bypass statutes such as the one here that "take
reasonable steps to prevent the public from leaming of the minor's identity" survive a facial
constitutional challenge); Bellotti I1, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (plurality opinion) (concluding that a
judicial bypass procedure and any appeals that follow it "will be completed with anonymity and
sufficient expedition").
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discipline students for possession of medical contraceptives in a manner
that violates a student's constitutional right of privacy. As such, a school
may not require mandatory parental consent in order for a student to
"legally" possess medical contraceptives at school. Further, a school
may not effectively force a student to notify her parents of her
contraceptive choices in order for the student to "legally" possess
medical contraceptives at school. Finally, a school may not discipline a
student for possession of medical contraception in such a way that
violates the student's constitutional privacy right.
Part I of this Comment discusses the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection of privacy surrounding a minor's contraceptive choices. Part
II examines parental consent and notification requirements in regards to
private procreative choices. Part III discusses the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection of one's private affairs from state
dissemination to the public, including the constitutional requirement that
proceedings impacting a minor's contraceptive choices be confidential.
Part IV describes zero tolerance policies and their impact on students
who have been disciplined for possessing otherwise legal medication,
and sets forth the rationale that proponents of zero tolerance have
offered to justify such policies. Finally, Part V argues that when zero
tolerance policies are applied to minors in possession of contraceptives
in a manner that effectively results in mandatory parental consent or
notification, or that disseminates information about the minor's private
affairs to the public, they violate the constitutional protections afforded
to minors by the Fourteenth Amendment.
I. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS A MINOR'S
PRIVACY RELATED TO CONTRACEPTIVE CHOICES
The right of privacy protected by the liberty guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids a state from
interfering in certain areas or zones of personal privacy.15 One
recognized privacy right relates to contraceptive choices. 16 This
particular right extends to minors as well as adults. 17 Furthermore, the
Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy protects a minor against school
15. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)). The state may
interfere, however, with a protected privacy right if it has a compelling interest in regulating the
matter and has narrowly tailored its regulation to affect only that interest. Id. at 685-86.
16. See id. at 685-86.
17. See id. at 693-94 (plurality opinion) (citing Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75).
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interference with her contraceptive decision-making, 8  barring a
significant state interest specific to minors.'
9
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Precludes a State from Interfering
with an Individual's Contraceptive Choices
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that
"[n]o State shall.., deprive any person of... liberty... without due
process of law., 20 The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized this
provision of the Due Process Clause-also known as the liberty
guarantee 2 '-as protecting individuals against unjustified government
interference with several kinds of private choices.22 Among these
protected private choices are decisions related to procreation.23
In particular, the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee protects
against unjustified government interference with an individual's
personal decision whether to use contraceptives.24 In Carey v.
Population Services International,25 the Supreme Court struck down a
statute that criminalized distributing contraceptives to minors and
forbade the distribution of contraceptives to adults except by a licensed
pharmacist. 26 In doing so, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
18. A school or school district serves as a state actor for Fourteenth Amendment protection
purposes. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
19. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 248 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects individuals' decisions concerning the intimacies of their physical relationships,
be they heterosexual or homosexual); Cruzan v. Missouri, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment protects an interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy encompasses a woman's
decision to terminate her pregnancy); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (holding that the
Fourteenth and First amendments forbid a state from making private possession of obscene material
a crime); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that various constitutional
provisions, including the Fourteenth Amendment, create a zone of privacy that bars a state from
forbidding the use of contraceptives by married persons).
23. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & n.26 (1977).
24. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977).
25. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
26. See id. at 681-82. A majority of the Court, while agreeing that the provision related to the
distribution of contraceptives to minors was unconstitutional, could not agree on the reasoning for
the constitutional infirmity. Thus, the opinion's reasoning related to that provision is dicta. See id. at
691-99 (plurality opinion) (noting that although an undisturbed state law allowed a physician to
provide a patient younger than sixteen with contraceptives as the physician "deemed proper," the
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shields both married and unmarried people from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into their contraceptive choices.27 The Court
further held that government regulations affecting a person's
contraceptive decisions must withstand strict scrutiny and will survive
only where justified by "compelling state interests" and "narrowly
drawn to express only those interests. 2 8
B. Interference with a Minor's Contraceptive Choices Is
Constitutional Only When Justified by a Significant State Interest
Unique to the Protection of Minors
The state has a greater interest in regulating the behavior of minors
than adults.29 Because of this heightened interest, the Supreme Court
held in Carey that a regulation that interferes with a minor's
contraceptive choices is subject to lesser scrutiny than a regulation
affecting an adult's contraceptive choices. 30 The test articulated by a
effect of both laws read together was to empower the physician with unconstitutional discretion
over the privacy rights of minors); id. at 702-03 (White, J., concurring in the result) (concurring on
the grounds that the state failed to demonstrate that prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to
minors advanced the state's purported justification for the statute: deterring minors from sexual
activity); id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concurring
on the grounds that the statute infringed upon the privacy rights of married females between the
ages of fourteen and sixteen, and prohibited parents from distributing contraceptives to their
children); id. at 712-16 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (concurring
for the reasons discussed by Justice Powell and because although Justice Stevens believed that the
state does have a significant interest in discouraging minors from engaging in sexual activity, "an
attempt to persuade by inflicting harm on the listener is an unacceptable means of conveying a
message that is otherwise legitimate").
27. See id. at 684-86. The Court stated: "'If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."' Id. at 685
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)). In Griswold, the Court had held that the
Constitution creates a "zone of privacy" that forbids a state from banning the use of contraceptives
by married people. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. In Eisenstadt, the Court extended that holding,
using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down a statute that banned
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried adults. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 443.
28. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
29. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60, 74-75 (1976);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
30. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 693; see also id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although a plurality
decision, a majority of the Court agreed that the appropriate inquiry when evaluating a state
regulation that impacts a minor's contraceptive choices is whether the state has a "significant"
interest justifying the impact. Id. at 693 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 713 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (implicitly accepting application of the "significant" interest test but disagreeing that
the interests of the state and a minor's parents do not rise to a significant interest justifying the
interference).
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majority of the justices requires that a regulation affecting a minor's
contraceptive choices advance a significant state interest that is not
present in the case of an adult.31 Regulations that fail to advance such a
significant state interest are unconstitutional.32
In the school discipline context, whether the circumstances
surrounding a certain policy justify infringement upon a student's
constitutionally protected right depends on the nature of the interest of
the student involved and the nature of the governmental concern at
issue.33 For example, in holding that the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches 34 was not violated by a school policy
that required the drug-testing of athletes, 35 the Court emphasized that by
voluntarily participating in school athletics students consented to
36lessened privacy expectations and greater school regulations. The
policy was "reasonable" because it targeted those students who
voluntarily participated in the closely regulated arena of student
athletics, 37 and the test at issue screened only for specific illegal drugs, 38
"not for whether the student is, for example .... pregnant., 39 The Court
noted that the policy's requirement that students, prior to being tested,
identify prescription medications that they are taking "raises some cause
for concern,"40 but held that so long as the student was permitted to
provide the information about the prescription medication "in a
31. Id. at 693 (plurality opinion); see also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75 (holding infringement on a
minor's abortion-related decision-making is only valid where there is a significant state interest in
requiring a third person's approval that is not present in the case of an adult).
32. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693 (plurality opinion); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75.
33. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995). In Vernonia, the Court
announced that when evaluating the constitutional validity of a school drug-testing policy, the first
factor to consider is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the search intrudes. See id. The
Court explained that this was because "the Fourth Amendment does not protect all subjective
expectations of privacy, but only those that society recognizes as legitimate." See id. (internal
quotations omitted).
34. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, § 1 ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches... shall not be violated . .
35. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660, 665.
36. See id. at 657.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 650-51.
39. Id. at 658; see also Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that the
behavior of a school swim coach who required that a student take a pregnancy test and then reported
the results of that test to, among others, the student's parents, violated constitutional protections of
even the presumably limited expectation of privacy that a student-athlete enjoys).
40. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 659.
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confidential manner,",41 the invasion of the student's privacy was not
significant.42
In evaluating the nature of the governmental interest in the statute at
issue in Eisenstadt v. Baird,4 3 which banned the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons," the Court rejected the state's
argument that the statute promoted the state's legitimate interest in
protecting the health of its citizenry.45 Applying an equal protection
analysis, 46 the Court held that the health protection justification was
unconstitutionally discriminatory and overbroad, and failed to present
even a rational basis47 justifying state interference. 48 Further, in rejecting
the argument that the statute's rational objective was to discourage
premarital sexual intercourse, the Court held that it would be "plainly
unreasonable" to assume that the state had prescribed pregnancy and the
birth of an unwanted child as the punishment for fornication.49
C. Schools and School Districts Are State Actors
Students do not "shed their constitutional rights ... at the
schoolhouse gate.",50 Thus, students have the right to be free from
unconstitutional state interference even while at school. 51 Under the
41. Id. at 660 (offering the example of enabling a student to deliver the information in a sealed
envelope to the testing lab as one way to protect confidentiality); see also id. at 684 n.2 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (stating that because the policy allows for confinement of the disclosure of highly
personal prescription medication information to the testing lab, the policy's disclosure requirement
is not one of its flaws). Under this testing regime, a student's parents are not notified of a positive
test unless the student twice tests positive for one of the specified drugs. See id. at 651 (majority
opinion).
42. See id. at 660.
43. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
44. See id. at 440-42.
45. See id. at 451-52.
46. In a prior opinion, the Court had held that the Constitution forbade banning the distribution of
contraceptives to married people. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
47. The "rational basis" test is the most lenient level of constitutional scrutiny that courts apply.
See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 555 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In the equal protection context the test requires that the government
regulation be related to a valid public purpose that justifies the different treatment of two groups of
people. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
48. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451.
49. Id. at 448.
50. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
51. Id.; see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause requires that a student facing suspension from school for ten
Zero Privacy
Fourteenth Amendment, state interference includes actions by school
districts, school boards, and school officials. 52 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court has emphasized the particular importance of holding schools
accountable for constitutional violations. 3
In sum, the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty guarantee forbids state
interference with a minor's contraceptive choices unless the interference
advances a significant state interest unique to the protection of minors. A
minor does not give up this constitutional protection when at school. A
school district stands in the shoes of the state for the purposes of
Fourteenth Amendment protection and is thus forbidden from interfering
with a minor's contraceptive choices in the absence of a significant state
interest.
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY ESTABLISHES CERTAIN
SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT MINORS' CONFIDENTIALITY
Regulations that inhibit a minor's decision whether to have an
abortion by requiring parental consent or notification are
unconstitutional unless they provide for a bypass option that would
allow a minor to avoid such parental involvement. 54 Though the
Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue in the contraceptive
context, the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of privacy in
procreative decision-making extends to both abortion and contraceptive
choices.55 In addition, constitutional parameters identified in abortion
cases simultaneously define parameters in contraceptive cases.56
days or less must be informed of the charges and given an opportunity to defend against them); W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that compelled flag salutation
in schools unconstitutionally "invade[d] the sphere of intellect and spirit" protected by the First
Amendment).
52. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 581 (holding that school officials are subject to the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985)
(stating that school officials carrying out disciplinary functions pursuant to school policies act as
representatives of the state); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 ("The Fourteenth Amendment... protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted.").
53. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637 (stating that a school board's role in "educating the young for
citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual").
54. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion); id. at 654-56
(Stevens, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & nn.23, 26 (1977).
56. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Since the
State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on
the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the
distribution of contraceptives to minors is afortiori foreclosed.").
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Moreover, the state has less of an interest in regulating contraceptive
choices than abortion choices.57
The Fourteenth Amendment also protects against government
disclosure of one's private affairs to the public. 58 This protection applies
to reporting and recordkeeping that impacts procreative decision-
making.59  The confidentiality requirement applies to minors'
reproductive choices as well as those of adults.60 A school that fails to
take appropriate steps to keep a student's procreation-related choices
private violates the student's right of privacy.61
A. Regulations Requiring Parental Consent to or Notification of a
Minor's Procreative Decision-Making Must Include a Judicial
Bypass Option
Because mandatory parental consent or notification may effectively
grant a third-party veto power over a minor's right to choose to have an
62abortion, courts have approved the creation of what they call a
"judicial bypass option." 63 This option allows a minor who either cannot
obtain parental consent or does not wish to involve her parents in her
decision64 to obtain an abortion if an authorized fact-finder65 determines
that either the minor is mature enough to make the abortion decision
without parental consent or the abortion would be in the minor's best
interest. 66 A statute that provides either a parent or another person with
the power to withhold consent to a minor's decision to have an abortion
is unconstitutional in the absence of a judicial bypass option.67
57. Id.
58. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99 & n.24.
59. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747, 766-68 (1986).
60. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 510-13 (1990); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah 1983).
61. See, e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000).
62. See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo, v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979) (plurality opinion).
64. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
65. See Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 643 n.22 (plurality opinion) (noting that the statute at issue
provided for state superior court involvement in minors' abortion choices, but stating that the Court
did not mean to suggest that a state could not delegate the alternative procedure to a juvenile court
or administrative agency or officer).
66. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (plurality opinion); Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (plurality
opinion).
67. See, e.g., Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 654-56 (Stevens,
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The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the judicial bypass option
requirement in the context of regulations inhibiting a minor's
contraceptive choices, but constitutional parameters that apply to
abortion cases inherently apply to contraceptive cases.68 In addition, a
federal district court has held that the bypass requirement applies in the
contraceptive context. 69 In Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v.
Matheson,70 the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah addressed
state legislation mandating parental notification when a minor requested
contraceptives. 7' The state argued that the notification requirement did
not burden any constitutionally protected right of privacy, or
alternatively, that if it did, it properly balanced those rights with parents'
right to be involved in their children's contraceptive decision-making.72
The district court rejected both arguments.73 Relying on Supreme Court
precedent regarding parental consent, vis-A-vis a minor's abortion and
contraceptive choices, the court held that the legislation was
unconstitutional because it failed to provide a judicial bypass option.74
B. The Protection Afforded a Minor's Contraceptive Choices Is
Distinct from and Stronger than that Relating to Abortion Choices
While the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
both abortion choices and contraceptive choices, 75 the Supreme Court
J., concurring); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75; cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 844, 899-900 (upholding a
parental consent provision where the statute contained a bypass option).
68. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Since the
State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on
the choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the
distribution of contraceptives to minors is afortiori foreclosed.").
69. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah 1983).
70. 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983).
71. Id. at 1002.
72. Id. at 1003.
73. Id. at 1009.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & n.23 (1977) (stating that "privacy cases"
have addressed at least two different kinds of interests-the interest in autonomy in certain kinds of
decision-making as addressed in cases such as Roe and Griswold, and the interest in "avoiding
disclosure of personal matters"); see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89
(1977) (stating in dicta that there is no independent fundamental right of access to contraceptives,
but that "such access is essential to exercise of the constitutionally protected right of decision in
matters of childbearing that is the underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold, Eisenstadt v.
Baird, and Roe v. Wade").
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expressly distinguished contraceptive issues from abortion issues in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.16 This
distinction is significant because in Casey, the plurality decision
purported to revise the test in the abortion line of privacy cases from a
sliding scale balancing the interests of the woman against the interests of
the government at different times in a woman's pregnancy, 77 to inquiring
whether the regulation imposes an "undue burden" on a woman's ability
to make the decision to have an abortion.78 However unclear the test for
abortion privacy cases may be after Casey, the Court did not revisit the
strict scrutiny test applied to regulations that interfere with a person's
contraceptive decision-making.7 9 Instead, a majority of the Court stated
that contraception is "protected independently under Griswold and later
cases" 80 and explicitly affirmed the contraceptive line of cases. 81 This
distinct treatment of privacy rights related to contraceptive choices is
logically in line with the plurality's assertion in Carey: that the state has
less of an interest in regulating access to contraception than it does in
regulating access to abortion.82
76. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
77. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
78. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 874 (plurality opinion). A plurality of the Casey Court also
purported to overrule the portion of Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759-65 (1986), that found statutory provisions requiring "the giving
of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the [abortion] procedure" to be
unconstitutional, stating that such a holding is "inconsistent with Roe's acknowledgment of an
important interest in potential life." Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
79. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 852-53, 859.
80. Id. at 859.
81. See id. at 852-53 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). That those privacy
cases addressing abortion and those addressing contraceptives are distinct is further evidenced by
the fact that the Court, when listing those personal decisions afforded protection by the Fourteenth
Amendment, consistently lists "procreation" and "contraception" separately. See, e.g., Carey, 431
U.S. at 685; see also Casey, 506 U.S. at 851.
82. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 (plurality opinion). Limited regulation of abortion is justified by
the state interest in preserving and protecting the health of a pregnant woman and, after a certain
point in the pregnancy, the state interest in protecting the potential of life in the fetus. See, e.g.,
Casey, 505 U.S. at 859 (stating that the scope of abortion rights, first defined in Roe, is confined by
the state's interest in "postconception potential life") (emphasis in original); Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-
64 (establishing the stages of a woman's pregnancy during which the state's interest in her health
and safety and the potential life of the fetus become "compelling" interests that may then justify
some state regulation); see also Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989)
(evidencing the difference between the Griswold and Roe lines of privacy cases by explaining that
unlike Roe's trimester framework, the Griswold line "did not purport to adopt a whole
framework... to govern the cases in which the asserted liberty interest would apply").
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C. States Are Required to Protect the Confidentiality ofPrivate
Procreative Choices
The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals from government
disclosure of personal matters to the public.83 This particular protection
has been dubbed "informational privacy" protection by the federal courts
and has often been applied to protect against state dissemination of
medical information and other highly sensitive personal information.84
The Supreme Court recognized this protection in Whalen v. Roe,85 where
it considered the constitutionality of a statute that required that doctors
prescribing highly addictive drugs report the recipients to the
Department of Health.86 Although declining to strike down the statute,87
the Court emphasized that when health information is collected for
public purposes, the privacy of that information is typically protected as
it was in the instant case-namely, in a statutory or regulatory fashion.88
Additionally, where dissemination of information would interfere with a
fundamental constitutional right, the protection against public
dissemination of that information is constitutionally rooted.89
Regulations that require reporting or recordkeeping related to an
individual's procreative choices must protect informational privacy.9°
The Court outlined the constitutional limits of such reporting and
recordkeeping requirements in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth.9' There, the Court upheld requirements that facilities and
physicians providing abortions report certain "maternal health and life
data" to the state.92 In its opinion, the Court emphasized that the
83. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
84. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002); see
also Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2000); Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d
1273, 1285 (D. Kan. 2004).
85. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
86. See id. at 591-92, 594-95.
87. Id. at 605-06.
88. See id. at 605. The statute included specific security provisions to safeguard confidentiality,
including a criminal penalty applicable to anyone who made a patient's identity public. See id. at
594-95.
89. See id. at 605 (stating that in some circumstances a state's duty to avoid unwarranted
disclosures of an individual's personal information is constitutionally rooted).
90. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747, 766-67 (1986); see also
Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002).
91. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
92. Id. at 79.
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particular information gathered was reasonably related to the
preservation of maternal health and the state would keep it confidential
and use it only for statistical purposes. 93 However, the Court cautioned
that the requirements would be unconstitutional if the state did not
adequately protect confidentiality or if the information were used for
purposes other than compiling statistical data.
94
The Court held that an abortion statute overreached these
constitutional limits in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists,95 where the statute included a clause requiring that a
provider report each abortion performed in the state.9 6 The statute
required each report to include information such as the patient's political
subdivision, state of residence, age, race, and marital status, and made
the reports available to the public for inspection and copying purposes.
97
Although the report would not include the patient's name, the Court
found that the information contained in the report would be so detailed
that identification was likely. 98 The Court thus held that the reporting
requirement was an unconstitutional violation of privacy, "pos[ing] an
unacceptable danger of deterring the exercise" of a woman's private
right to have an abortion.99 Further, "the scope of the information
required and its availability to the public belie any assertions ... that it is
advancing any legitimate interest."' 00
The Fourteenth Amendment informational privacy protection applies
when minors, as well as adults, exercise the right to make procreative-
related decisions.""0 In Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,0 2
93. Id. at 80.
94. Id. at 79, 81; see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 765-67.
95. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
96. See id. at 765.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 766-67.
99. Id. at 767-68. The Thornburgh Court described efforts to protect confidentiality as an
"inherent" requirement to sustain the constitutionality of regulations affecting the abortion decision.
Id. at 766 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J. concurring in the
judgment)). The Court feared that the reporting requirements at issue would subject an individual
exercising a constitutionally protected right to public exposure and possible harassment. Id. at 767.
In deciding that this result would be unacceptable, the Court analogized to several First Amendment
decisions, reiterating that the government may not "chill the exercise" of a fundamental
constitutional fight by requiring the disclosure of protected activities, no matter how unpopular. Id.
at 767.
100. Id. at 765.
101. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002)
(stating that it is undisputed that the information a court receives during a judicial bypass
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the Court held that in order for an abortion statute's parental consent
requirement to pass constitutional muster, the state must make an effort
to "insure the minor's anonymity."10 3 Although the Court stated that
complete anonymity is not critical, reasonable steps must be taken to
protect the minor's identity from being revealed to the public.1
0 4
D. Schools Have a Duty to Protect Minors' Constitutionally Protected
Decision-Making from Public Dissemination
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the first federal
circuit court to address the question) made it clear in Gruenke v. Seip'0 5
that schools have a duty to protect the confidentiality of minors' private
medical affairs.10 6 There, the court considered whether a high school
coach violated a student's informational privacy right by requiring the
student to take a pregnancy test and eventually informing her teammates,
their parents, and the student's mother of the student's pregnancy. 10 7 In
reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment to the school, the
Third Circuit held that information about a student's pregnancy status
clearly implicates medical information, entitled to protection from public
disclosure under Whalen. 10 8 The court remanded the case, stating that if
the plaintiff proved her allegations, the coach's failure to take
appropriate steps to keep the information about the pregnancy test
confidential could infringe upon the student's Fourteenth Amendment
proceeding is worthy of constitutional protection as "informational privacy," discussed by the
Supreme Court in Whalen); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302-03 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a
high school student who alleged that her swim coach told her family and teammates about her
pregnancy had a right to be free from disclosure of personal matters as recognized by the Supreme
Court in Whalen); see also Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1285 (D. Kan. 2004)
(citing Whalen for the proposition that there is a right to informational privacy).
102. 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
103. Id. at 512.
104. Id.; see also Lawall, 307 F.3d at 788 (finding the statute at issue to have taken "reasonable
steps" to meet the anonymity requirement because that statute contained statements that: (1) all
judicial bypass proceedings are confidential and "shall" not be made public; (2) members of the
public are not to have access to information about the proceedings; (3) the court is to order that all
records related to the proceeding be confidentially maintained; and (4) the pregnant minor is
allowed to use a fictitious name during the proceedings).
105. 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000).
106. See id. at 302-03. The U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed this issue.
107. See id. at 296-97, 302-03.
108. Id. at 302-03; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
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informational privacy right.1 09
In sum, the Fourteenth Amendment protects both minors' privacy in
the procreative decision-making context and their right to be free from
state dissemination of their private affairs to the public. Specifically, any
regulation regarding contraceptive choices that includes parental
notification or consent requirements must also provide a bypass option
whereby a minor may avoid parental involvement. Confidentiality is an
inherent requirement in abortion statutes, and bypass procedures must
include reasonable steps to shield a minor's identity from the public.
Further, the right of informational privacy also applies to choices related
to procreation, and school officials, as state actors, must take reasonable
steps to protect a minor's informational privacy rights.
IV. MANY ZERO TOLERANCE POLICIES REQUIRE PARENTAL
CONSENT AND FAIL TO PROTECT PRIVATE AFFAIRS
Schools have broadly applied zero tolerance drug policies to a wide
range of prescription and non-prescription medication, including items
not traditionally considered "medication," such as vitamins and birth
control pills.11 ° Many zero tolerance drug policies subject a student to
discipline, normally without exception, 11 if the school catches her in
possession of any kind of medication at school, unless the student
previously obtained parental permission to possess that medication." 2
The consequence of that discipline has included the notification of the
student's parents and the general public.' 13 Nevertheless, the proponents
of these policies argue that zero tolerance policies are in the students'
109. See id.
110. See, e.g., Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (reviewing a
school board's expulsion of a fifth grader for possessing and distributing a nonprescription vitamin
pill in violation of a policy that prohibited "medicine"); Kahne, supra note 4 (reporting on a student
disciplined for possessing birth control pills in violation of school's zero tolerance policy).
111. These policies often mandate predetermined and severe punishment for specific offenses,
regardless of the severity of those offenses or the background of the student. See Cherry Henault,
Zero Tolerance in Schools, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 547, 547 (2001). Although due process requires that
school districts retain some discretion to modify the punishment, they often do not do so. See Joan
M. Wasser, Note, Zeroing In On Zero Tolerance, 15 J.L. & POL. 747, 760, 769-772 (1999).
112. See, e.g., School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-451 r.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
113. The media are often alerted to zero tolerance policy violations. See, e.g., Grogan, supra note
3 (reporting a student's suspension for taking Aleve, to relieve menstrual cramps, in violation of a
zero tolerance policy); Editorial, supra note 3 (reporting a student's five-day suspension for
possessing heartbum-relief medication in violation of a zero tolerance policy).
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best interests.1 14
A. Zero Tolerance Drug Policies Often Require that a Student Obtain
Parental Consent to Possess Contraceptives or Risk Being
Punished for That Possession
Generally, zero tolerance drug policies that cover prescription and
over-the-counter medication allow students to bring legally prescribed or
over-the-counter medication to school only if the student provides the
school with a doctor's note, parental approval, or both.' 15 A
representative Ohio school district policy provides that "[a] student shall
not knowingly possess[,] ... consume, use, handle, give, store, [or]
conceal ... any.., non-prescription or prescription drug (except when
under the direction of a physician/parent and within school
procedure... ).,16 Violation of this policy results in a ten-day
suspension and a chemical dependency evaluation.11 7 Often, zero
tolerance policies do not define "prescription drug," but where
definitions are included they can be broad, such as the City of Virginia
Beach policy that defines prohibited "medication" as "any drug or other
substances used in treating disease, healing, or relieving pain, including
all over-the-counter drugs such as aspirin, cough syrups, gargles,
caffeine pills and the like."11 8 Many zero tolerance policies further forbid
students from self-administering or personally possessing medication
114. See, e.g., Mike Cronin, Zero Tolerance has Zero Sense to Some, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 1,
2005, at Al (reporting that in the post-Columbine world, some proponents of zero tolerance policies
argue that the "failure to consistently enforce strict policies can ultimately result in calamities such
as... Red Lake and ... Columbine").
115. See, e.g., School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-451 r.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (requiring that a parent,
legal guardian, or other responsible adult bring any medication, "even if recommended or prescribed
for the student's use" to the office at the start of the school day for safekeeping, in order to comply
with the school's policy).
116. Smartt v. Clifton, No. C-3-96-389, 1997 WL 1774874, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 1997)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis and third alteration in original).
117. Id.
118. School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-45-lr.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). While it may be argued
that a phrase such as "used in treating disease, healing, or relieving pain" is a limiting phrase that
would restrict the application of a policy to only those substances that fit that definition, schools
have tended to interpret zero tolerance drug policies broadly to include even substances that
arguably are not drugs or medicine at all. See, e.g., Bertens v. Stewart, 453 So. 2d 92, 93-94 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (reviewing a school board's expulsion of a fifth grader for possessing and
distributing a nonprescription vitamin pill in violation of a policy that prohibited "medicine").
Washington Law Review
while on school grounds, requiring that the student leave parentally
approved medication for safekeeping with the school nurse." 9
B. Many Zero Tolerance Drug Policies Mandate the Discipline of
Students and the Notification of Students' Parents for Possession of
Otherwise Legal Prescription and Over-the-Counter Medication
Pursuant to zero tolerance drug policies, schools across the country
have punished students for possession and use of a variety of substances
that, but for the application of zero tolerance policies, would be perfectly
legal.1 20 For example, schools have severely disciplined students for
taking ibuprofen for menstrual cramps, 12' possessing heartbum-relief
medicine to control intestinal gas, 22 and sharing zinc cough drops
without first clearing the cough drops with the school office. 23 In one
particularly egregious example, a school expelled a fourteen-year-old for
eighty days for taking Midol for severe menstrual pain 124 and giving
Midol to another student. 25 That school's zero tolerance policy provided
that "student[s] shall not knowingly possess[,] ... consume, use, handle,
give, store, [or] conceal... any.., non-prescription or prescription drug
(except when under the direction of a physician/parent and within school
procedure.. .).,,26 District officials later told the punished student that if
she and her parent agreed to have her undergo a substance abuse
evaluation, the district would remove the expulsion from her school
119. See, e.g., School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-45lr.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006); see also Molly Ball,
Schools Working to Distinguish Misbehaving from Criminal Acts, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 23, 2005,
at Dl (describing a policy that requires even over-the-counter medication like Tylenol be dispersed
to students by the nurse's office).
120. See, e.g., Bertens, 453 So. 2d at 93-94 (reviewing a school board's expulsion of a fifth
grader for possessing and distributing a nonprescription vitamin pill in violation of a policy that
prohibited "medicine").
121. See Voir Dire: Suit Over Pill, NAT'L L.J., at 15 (May 24, 2004); see also Stephanie L.
Arnold, Student Sorry About Violation: Haverford High Suspended Her a Half-Day for Taking a
Pain Reliever, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 29, 2005, at B02; Grogan, supra note 3, at BOI.
122. See Elaine D. Briseno, Heartburn Drug Leads to School Suspension, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB.,
Jan. 9, 2004, at A1; Editorial, supra note 3.
123. See Henault, supra note 11, at 548.
124. See Smartt v. Clifton, No. C-3-96-389, 1997 WL 1774874, at * 1, *20 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10,
1997).
125. Id. at *10.
126. Id. at *8 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis and third alteration in
original).
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record. 27
An Oklahoma school district demonstrated that some school
administrators include prescription contraception within the scope of
zero tolerance drug policies when it suspended a fourteen-year-old for
prescription hormone pills found in her purse.1 28 Administrators claimed
that a district-wide "zero tolerance policy" mandated a one-year
suspension for student possession of any "illegal" substance, including
cough drops or legally prescribed medication.129 After the student
obtained legal representation, the district agreed to reduce the suspension
to five days if the student attended drug counseling and underwent
urinalysis.' 30 However, the district told the student that her suspension
for this possession of an "illegal substance" would remain on her
permanent record.' 3' The student appealed the decision and eventually,
after the involvement of lawyers, a settlement with the district was
reached expunging her record.
132
C. Proponents of Zero Tolerance Policies Justify Such Policies as
Appropriate Measures to Protect Students
Supporters of zero tolerance policies claim that the purpose of such
policies is to protect students. 33 Proponents specifically argue that the
127. Id. at *1 1.
128. See Kahne, supra note 4.
129. Id.; see also POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR MUSTANG PUBLIC SCHOOLS, POLICY #5080,
available at http://www.mustangps.org/filemgmt/uploads/pandp%2012-20-05.pdf (last visited Mar.
28, 2006) (defining "illicit drug" to include any prescription or non-prescription drug along with
"any substance which is represented to be a prescription or non-prescription drug"). Use or
possession of any illicit drug while on school property "will result in suspension." Id. The policy
mandates, for a first offense, suspension for the current and succeeding semester. Id. That
suspension may be reduced to ten days if the student agrees to undergo urinalysis and chemical
dependency counseling. Id.
130. Kahne, supra note 4.
131. Id.
132. See Sarah Kahne, Settlement Reached with Student, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 12, 2005, at
IA. Ironically, after settlement, the school board announced that it did not in fact have a zero
tolerance policy in place, as school administrators had "discretion" under the policy. Id. However,
under that definition of "zero tolerance," no school would ever have a true zero tolerance policy,
because constitutional due process requires that school boards retain the power to modify
punishment on a case-to-case basis. See, e.g., Wasser, supra note 11l, at 760, 769-72 (stating that
while due process requires that school boards retain the power to modify punishment on a case-to-
case basis, many do not do so either because they do not realize that the policy allows such
modification, they are concerned about uniformity in punishment, or they fear litigation).
133. See. e.g., Arnold, supra note 121 (quoting a high school principal's rationale for a zero
tolerance policy that resulted in the suspension of a student for taking a generic version of Aleve for
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policies keep schools safe134 and have the general support of parents and
school officials. 135 In attempting to identify the school's rationale for a
policy that resulted in a fourteen-year-old's suspension for giving a
friend Midol, a federal district court found that the school's justification
for the policy was "the need to protect students who may have adverse
reactions to non-prescription medication; the need to control the flow of
all substances, legal and illegal, in the public schools; and the need to
ensure that even non-prescription drugs are not used in a harmful
manner by students."' 36 These rationalizations encompass the primary
justifications put forth on behalf of zero tolerance proponents. 137
In sum, schools have broadly applied zero tolerance drug policies to a
wide range of medication, including prescription contraceptives. Under
such policies, students must obtain parental permission to possess
otherwise legal medical contraceptives. Schools have severely
disciplined students even for minor violations of these policies-
including possession of otherwise legal substances. The effect of such
discipline has included notification of students' parents and the general
public. Nevertheless, the proponents of zero tolerance policies argue that
such policies are in students' best interests.
V. MANY ZERO TOLERANCE DRUG POLICIES VIOLATE
MINORS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Requiring that a student obtain parental consent in order to "legally"
possess medical contraceptives at school amounts to a blanket parental
consent requirement of the type that the Supreme Court has held to be an
unconstitutional violation of a minor's Fourteenth Amendment right of
privacy. 138 Also, when a school disciplines a minor under a zero
menstrual cramps).
134. See Cronin, supra note 114.
135. See Henault, supra note 11, at 548.
136. Smartt v. Clifton, No. C-3-96-389, 1997 WL 1774874, at *21 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 1997).
137. See, e.g., Nathan L. Essex, Zero Tolerance and Student Dress Codes, PRINCIPAL MAG.,
Sept./Oct. 2004, at 54, available at http://www.naesp.org/ContentLoad.do?contentld=1318
(explaining that zero tolerance polices are a means of reducing and preventing violence and that
school policies are considered reasonable by the courts when they are "necessary to maintain proper
order, decorum, and a peaceful school environment").
138. See, e.g., Bellotti I1, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion); id. at 654-56
(Stevens, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976)
(holding a statute that required parental consent in order for a minor to obtain an abortion amounted
to an unconstitutional third party veto over a minor's right of privacy related to procreative
decision-making); see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001,
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tolerance policy for possessing contraceptives, the discipline
unavoidably and unconstitutionally results in parental notification of her
contraceptive choices. 139  Disciplining a student for possessing
contraceptives also often results in unconstitutional dissemination of the
student's private affairs to the public.1 40  Moreover, none of the
rationalizations proffered in support of such policies amount to a
significant state interest justifying interference in a minor's procreative
decision-making.141
A. Zero Tolerance Policies Requiring Parental Consent for Student
Possession of Contraceptives Are Unconstitutional in the Absence
of a Judicial Bypass Procedure or Its Equivalent
School policies that forbid students from possessing contraceptives
without parental consent effectively compel students to obtain third-
party consent in order to exercise their constitutionally protected right to
make contraceptive choices. 142 If a minor is required to obtain parental
consent in order to avoid violating such a policy, the parent may choose
to withhold consent, resulting in an unconstitutional arbitrary veto. 143 In
the alternative, a student who does not wish to risk violating the policy,
but also does not wish to inform her parents of her contraceptive
choices, may instead choose to stop using contraceptives, 44 despite her
constitutional right to choose to do so.
14 5
Even if a student avoids parental consent by choosing to risk violating
a zero tolerance policy, disciplining a student caught with medical
1009 (D. Utah 1983).
139. Cf, e.g., Briseno, supra note 122 (reporting a student's suspension for carrying Gas-X in
violation of a policy that required that the school nurse dispense all over-the-counter and
prescription medication). The student's mother was called and the student was threatened by the
principal with police involvement. Id.
140. See, e.g., id.
141. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
142. See, e.g., School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-45-1r.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) (requiring that a parent,
legal guardian, or other responsible adult bring any medication, "even if recommended or prescribed
for the student's use" to the office at the start of the school day for safekeeping, in order to comply
with the school's policy).
143. Cf, e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
144. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001, 1009 (D. Utah
1983).
145. See Carey v. Population Servs Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (plurality opinion); Danforth,
428 U.S. at 74-75.
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contraceptives in violation of a zero tolerance policy has the
impermissible result of notifying the minor's parents of her
contraceptive choices. 146 This unavoidable parental notification
unconstitutionally interferes with a minor's Fourteenth Amendment right
of privacy.1 47 Notification, or the threat thereof, is likely to result in
severe infringement of students' contraceptive-related decision-
making.t 48 Such notification through punishment is also at odds with the
Court's holding regarding recordkeeping and reporting in Danforth.149
Thus, in order to ensure the constitutionality of zero tolerance drug
policies, schools must provide a bypass option allowing violators to
remain anonymous under certain circumstances. 1
50
B. Disciplining a Minor for Possessing Contraceptives Results in
Unconstitutional Public Dissemination of the Minor's Private
Decision to Use Contraceptives
When a school disciplines a student for violating its zero tolerance
policy, the likelihood of the community discovering the minor's identity
and the reason for the suspension is great.' 51 This likelihood creates an
"unacceptable danger" of violating the minor's constitutional right of
privacy when contraceptives are involved. 152 The Supreme Court was
unwilling to risk this danger when it dealt with abortion-reporting
statutes, which provided less information about a woman's identity than
is often obtained by a community regarding a minor who violates a zero
tolerance policy. 53 In addition, the Court has held that the protection
146. See, e.g., Briseno, supra note 122.
147. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1460 (8th Cir.
1995) (requiring the state to provide a method to determine whether a minor was capable of making
an informed choice about abortion before allowing a parental notification requirement), cert. denied
sub nom., Janklow v. Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic, 517 U.S. 1174 (1996).
148. See, e.g., Matheson, 582 F. Supp. at 1009.
149. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 81 (finding that reporting requirements that impact decisions
protected by the right of privacy were not to be applied "in such a way as to accomplish.., what we
have held to be an otherwise unconstitutional restriction" -specifically, unconstitutionally
mandating parental consent).
150. See, e.g., School Board of the City of Virginia Beach, Va., Regulation 5-45.1, available at
http://www.vbschools.com/policies/5-45 lr.asp (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
151. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 121; Briseno, supra note 122; Mike Cronin, Parents Say
Jordan Drug Policy is Excessive, SALT LAKE TRIB., May 29, 2004, at Al; Cronin, supra note 114;
Grogan, supra note 3; Kahne, supra note 4.
152. Cf, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obsts. & Gyns., 476 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1986).
153. See id. at 765-67. In Thornburgh, the Court noted that "although the statute does not
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from dissemination of one's private affairs is essential when the
information at issue relates to the personal decision of whether to bear or
beget a child.154 Furthermore, like the student's pregnancy at issue in
Gruenke, a student's choice to use contraceptives is medical information
protected from compelled disclosure by the Fourteenth Amendment.
155
Accordingly, when a school disciplines a student under a zero tolerance
drug policy for possessing contraceptives, the discipline often results in
the reporting of the student's private affairs to the school community and
to the public at large-a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
informational privacy right.' 
56
C. Zero Tolerance Drug Policies Do Not Advance a Significant State
Interest Justifying Interference with a Minor's Contraceptive
Privacy Rights
Zero tolerance advocates proffer several rationalizations for such
policies, 157  none of which justify infringement upon a minor's
specifically require the reporting of the woman's name, the amount of information about her and the
circumstances under which she had an abortion are so detailed that identification is likely." Id. at
766-67. When a community learns of a student's suspension, the community learns of the student's
name; unlike the issue in Thornburgh, such discipline results in direct, rather than circumstantial
reporting of a woman's identity.
154. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see, e.g,, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 766-68
(holding that a statute that required reporting certain demographic information about women who
had abortions necessarily would result in chilling the exercise of a woman's right of privacy in
making procreative decisions and noting "that the Court consistently has refused to allow
government to chill the exercise of constitutional rights by requiring disclosure of protected, but
sometimes unpopular, activities.").
155. Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 302-03 (3rd Cir. 2000); see also Vemonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658-60 (1995) (implying that a school policy that invaded a student's right of
privacy related to medical information without enabling the student to keep that information
confidential would be a significant invasion of the student's privacy right); Whalen v. Roe 429 U.S.
589, 600 (1977) (acknowledging the existence of a privacy right in nondisclosure of medical
information).
156. See, e.g., Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99; see also Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall,
307 F.3d 783, 790 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that it is undisputed that the information a court receives
during a judicial bypass proceeding is worthy of constitutional protection as "informational
privacy," discussed by the Supreme Court in Whalen); Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303 (holding that a
high school student who alleged that her swim coach told her family and teammates about her
pregnancy had a right to be free from disclosure of personal matters as recognized by the Supreme
Court in Whalen); Aid for Women v. Foulston, 327 F. Supp. 2d 1273, 1285 (D. Kan. 2004) (citing
Whalen for the proposition that there is a right to informational privacy).
157. Cf., e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976)
(addressing Missouri's justifications for its restrictions on minors' abortions).
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fundamental constitutional right of privacy.' 8 Proponents of zero
tolerance have defended the policies by arguing that they protect
students' health,1 59 keep schools safe, 60 and have the general support of
parents and school officials. 161 However, none of these rationalizations
amount to a significant state interest not present in the case of an
adult.' 62 First, the argument that regulations infringing upon the decision
to use contraceptives are justified if they serve to protect health1 63 was
rejected by the Supreme Court in Eisenstadt.64 While the desire to
protect students allergic to certain medications is a laudable one, where
such an attempt at protection sweeps up all prescription and over-the-
counter medication in its path, including medical contraception, the
policy is, like the statute at issue in Eisenstadt, overbroad and thus
cannot justify the privacy infringement.
In addition, because the Court has held that a minor's privacy right
outweighs the parental interest in notification, 65 infringing upon a
minor's contraceptive choices by enforcing zero tolerance drug policies
cannot be justified simply by parental support for the policies. 166 There
is no significant state interest giving the state the constitutional authority
to bestow a third party, parent or otherwise, with "an absolute, and
possibly arbitrary, veto"' 67 over a minor's decision to exercise her
constitutionally protected right. 68 Further, "safeguarding of the family
unit and of parental authority" is not a significant state interest sufficient
to overcome a minor's privacy right. 169 The same concerns in the
158. Cf Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (raising and dismissing several of the proffered justifications
for the differential treatment of married and unmarried persons).
159. See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 121.
160. See Cronin, supra note 114.
161. See Henault, supra note 111, at 548.
162. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (plurality opinion);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
163. See, e.g., Smartt v. Clifton, No. C-3-96-389, 1997 WL 1774874, at *24 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10,
1997) (finding that one of the school's rationales for its zero tolerance drug policy was "to protect
students who may have adverse reactions to non-prescription medication").
164. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451-52 (1972).
165. See, e.g., Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44, 651 (1979) (plurality opinion); id. at 654-56
(Stevens, J., concurring); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
166. See Henault, supra note 111, at 548.
167. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
168. See id. at 74-75; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
169. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75; see also Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Utah v. Matheson, 582 F.
Supp. 1001, 1008 (D. Utah 1983) (stating that a majority of the Supreme Court has indicated that
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abortion context that led the Court to require judicial bypass options
make it evident that the arena of procreative-related decision-making is
one where a minor's interests at times trump those of the parents.
170
Contraception is a topic on which "many parents hold strong views,"'
' 71
and a minor's procreative decision-making should be based upon "the
best interests of [the minor].' 7 2 Thus, the concern that a parent or third
party might exercise a "possibly arbitrary"'173 veto over a minor's
constitutionally protected private decision leads courts to invalidate
parental consent requirements without judicial bypass options, putting
the privacy interests of the minor before her parents' interests. 1
74
For the same reasons, a safety-based justification of zero tolerance
policies175 must be rejected. A school could not constitutionally exercise
what is effectively a third-party veto over a minor's procreative choices
when the Court has held that the Constitution forecloses the minor's
parents or other third party from doing just that.' 76 In addition, although
the Court held in Vernonia School District v. Acton 177 that infringement
of student privacy rights may be justified by certain safety concerns
related to drugs in schools,' 78 such policies are troublesome where they
are conducted without confidentiality safeguards and they inquire into
students' private medical affairs. 1
79
In sum, when a school district applies a zero tolerance policy to
minors in possession of legally obtained contraceptives, the school
cannot force a student to notify her parents of her procreative choices in
both state and parental interests "must give way to the constitutional right of a mature minor or of
an immature minor whose best interests are contrary to parental involvement").
170. Cf, e.g., Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 643-44, 651 (plurality opinion); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-
75.
171. Bellotti H, 443 U.S. at 647 (plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 649.
173. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
174. See id. at 74-75.
175. See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 114.
176. Cf, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 691-99 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(noting that although an undisturbed state law allowed a physician to provide a patient younger than
sixteen with contraceptives as the physician "deemed proper," the effect of both laws read together
was to empower the physician with unconstitutional discretion over the privacy rights of minors);
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74-75.
177. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
178. Id. at 662.
179. Id. at 658-60 (implying that a school policy that invaded a student's right of privacy related
to medical information without enabling the student to keep that information confidential would be
a significant invasion of that student's privacy right).
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order to comply with the policy. Such policies must include a bypass
option that enables the student to avoid acquiring parental consent in
order for the student to possess contraceptives at school. In addition,
zero tolerance policies may not violate minors' constitutional right to be
free from state dissemination of their private affairs-a natural
consequence of disciplining students in possession of contraceptives in
violation of the zero tolerance policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Schools violate their students' Fourteenth Amendment right of
privacy when they apply zero tolerance drug policies to possession of
medical contraceptives and require parental consent for a student to
possess medical contraceptives and not run afoul of the policy. The
constitutional right of privacy protecting an individual's procreative-
related decision-making applies to minors as well as adults and does not
disappear in the school setting. Unless a zero tolerance policy provides
for an option (analogous to the "judicial bypass" of the abortion context)
by which a student may avoid obtaining parental consent in order to
"legally" possess medical contraceptives without first acquiring parental
permission, the policy amounts to an unconstitutional mandatory
parental consent requirement. In addition, a zero tolerance policy may
not constitutionally compel a minor to notify a parent of the minor's
private procreative decisions. Furthermore, because zero tolerance
policies may not violate minors' constitutional right to be free from state
dissemination of their private affairs, schools must take reasonable steps
to insure that minors' procreative-related decisions will remain
confidential.
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